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ALTERNATIVES TO A CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT: HOW CONGRESS MAY
PROVIDE FOR THE QUICK, TEMPORARY
FILLING OF HOUSE MEMBER SEATS IN
EMERGENCIES BY STATUTE
Paul Taylor*
INTRODUCTION
Recently, some have argued that a constitutional amendment
is necessary to provide for the temporary appointment of House
members to fill seats left vacant by terrorist attacks directed at
Congress and resulting in large numbers of casualties. Norman
Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute, for example, has
written that “[i]f a large number of House members were
disabled and/or killed, the Constitution limits replacement to
special elections . . . . As a general rule, I oppose constitutional
amendments. But there is no other way to confront this
problem.”1 Such an amendment, H.J. Res. 67, introduced in the
107th Congress, would authorize governors to appoint persons to
take the place temporarily of members who had died or become
incapacitated when 25% or more of all House members were

* The author is counsel to the House Subcommittee on the Constitution.
He is a graduate of Yale College, summa cum laude, and of the Harvard Law
School, cum laude. The conclusions and opinions expressed in the article are
exclusively those of the author, and do not represent any official or unofficial
position of the House Committee on the Judiciary, any of its subcommittees,
or any of its members.
1
Norman Ornstein, Worst Case Scenarios Demand the House’s
Immediate Attention, ROLL CALL, Nov. 8, 2001, at 8.
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unable to perform their duties.2 However, this article explores the
bases for congressional authority, by statute, to provide for the
quick, temporary filling of House member seats in emergencies.
As the Congressional Research Service has pointed out,3 H.J.
Res. 67 is not the first proposed amendment of its kind to have
been introduced. From the 1940s through 1962, the issue of
filling House vacancies in the event of a national emergency
generated considerable interest among some members of
Congress during the “Cold War” with the Soviet Union. More
than thirty proposed constitutional amendments that provided for
temporarily filling House vacancies or selecting successors in
case of the disability of a significant number of representatives
were introduced from the 79th through the 87th Congress.4 The
House has never voted on any of these proposals.5
2

See H.J. Res. 67, § 1.
See Sula P. Richardson, House Vacancies: Selected Proposals to Allow
for Filling Them Due to National Emergencies, Cong. Res. Serv. (CRS), at 3
n.5 (Dec. 3, 2001).
4
The proposals are as follow: H.J. Res. 362, 79th Cong. (1945-1947);
H.J. Res. 34, S.J. Res. 161, 80th Cong. (1947-1949); H.J. Res. 48, 81st
Cong. (1949-1951); H.J. Res. 155, 166, S.J. Res. 59, 75, 82d Cong. (19511953); H.J. Res. 135, 159, 244, 507, S.J. Res. 39, 150, 83d Cong. (19531955); H.J. Res. 50, 295, 322, 325, 475, S.J. Res. 8, 84th Cong. (19551957); H.J. Res. 52, 105, S.J. Res. 157, 85th Cong. (1957-1959); H.J. Res.
30, 519, S.J. Res. 85, 86th Cong. (1959-1961); H.J. Res. 29, 74, 91, 508,
893, S.J. Res. 123, 87th Cong. (1961-1963).
5
Many of the current issues raised and policy arguments offered in
support of or in opposition to the temporary appointment of representatives are
the same as those that were made fifty years ago. See 100 CONG. REC. 7660
(1954) (remarks of Senator Knowland).
The proposed amendment is a form of insurance which, of course, we
hope will never have to be used, but, in view of the fact that we are
on notice, at least, that it would be conceivably possible to eliminate
the House of Representatives . . . by a single attack on the Nation’s
Capital, I believe that we can no longer, as prudent citizens and as
prudent Members of the House and the Senate, ignore that possibility.
Id. See also APPOINTMENT OF REPRESENTATIVES IN TIME OF NATIONAL
EMERGENCY, S. REP. NO. 1459, at 3 (1954) (“Acts of violence may
encompass attacks by atomic or hydrogen weapons, germ warfare, or even
wholesale assassination of Members of the House by less spectacular
3
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H.J. Res. 67 and similar proposals are based implicitly on the
understanding that the Constitution does not provide a mechanism
for the temporary appointment of House members following
vacancies. This understanding is based on the Seventeenth
Amendment to the Constitution, which provides for the popular
election of senators and the filling of Senate seat vacancies
through gubernatorial appointments,6 and the fact that there is no
similar provision in the Constitution explicitly authorizing states
to provide for temporary appointments of House members.
Alternatively, this article explores the bases for congressional
authority, by statute, to provide for the quick, temporary filling
of House member seats in emergencies. By providing for the
temporary filling of vacant House seats by statute, rather than by
constitutional amendment, Congress could more flexibly adapt to
particular emergency situations and avoid the lengthy amendment
process. Neither the intent behind the Seventeenth Amendment,
nor the Constitution’s voting rights provisions, prohibit
Congress’ exercise of its authority under Article I, section 4,
Clause 1 to provide for the temporary filling of vacant House
seats either through elections by a limited electorate or possibly
by appointment.

weapons.”).
The events of September 11, 2001, have raised additional issues. Suicidal
terrorists may act independently from sovereign nations and may not be
deterred from using weapons of mass destruction because of the possible
consequences for their own people. On the other hand, the situation in the
1950s may have been even more dire than today because a nuclear attack was
expected to occur, if at all, with overwhelming force that would have
destroyed much if not most of the American land mass. See 100 CONG. REC.
7661 (1954) (remarks of Senator Knowland) (“[I]n the event of an atomic
attack . . . we may assume, at least for purposes of our discussion, that in the
various States of the Union . . . there would be a simultaneous enemy attack.
It might be very difficult even to hold elections within a period of 60 days.”).
6
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
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I. THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT AND CONGRESS’
AUTHORITY TO MAKE REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE TIME,
PLACES AND MANNER OF HOLDING FEDERAL ELECTIONS
Prior to adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment, Article I,
Section 3, of the Constitution provided that senators would be
chosen by state legislatures. Because state legislatures were often
in session for only small portions of the year, Article I, Section
3, provided that “during the Recess of the Legislature of any
State, the executive thereof may make temporary Appointments
until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill
such vacancies.”7 Debates on the Seventeenth Amendment do not
indicate that the amendment was intended to do anything other
than provide for the popular election of senators, with the
temporary appointment language of Article I, Section 3 simply
carrying over into the Seventeenth Amendment.8
7

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3; see also THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES AND THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 2-3 (U.S. Gov’t Printing
Office 2000).
8
The congressional debates over the Seventeenth Amendment also lend
some support to the view that, at least in the minds of those addressing the
question during such congressional debates, Congress already had the
authority to enact a law authorizing the temporary filling of vacant House seats
in the event of an emergency.
The Senate initially proposed and passed the Seventeenth Amendment that
is part of our Constitution today. That amendment provides as follows:
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators
from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each
Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the
qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of
the State legislatures. When vacancies happen in the representation of
any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall
issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the
legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make
temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election
as the legislature may direct.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
When the House considered its version of the Seventeenth Amendment, it
considered a proposed amendment that denied Congress its existing
constitutional authority under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution “to alter”
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state laws governing the election of senators. The relevant portion of H.J. Res.
39 that the House considered stated that “[t]he times, places, and manner of
holding elections for Senators shall be as prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof.” See 47 CONG. REC. 203 (1991). This amendment would
have given state legislatures the exclusive authority to make laws governing
the election of senators. Many congressmen opposed the change on the
grounds that it denied Congress the ability to guarantee that senators would be
sent to Congress in “emergency” situations. See 47 CONG. REC. 233 (1911)
(remarks of Mr. Saunders). Those who opposed such a change stressed the
importance of Congress’ ability to preserve itself in the event of unpredictable
future events. Congressman Cannon stated the following:
I will not vote for such an amendment . . . . The Federal Government
of the United States, a Government of limited power, supreme where
power is granted under the Constitution, should always have the
power to perpetuate itself without regard to what any States may do in
failing to perform their duty.
47 CONG. REC. 213 (1911) (remarks of Mr. Cannon). Congressman Nye
asked, “Can we afford to divest Congress of a constitutional power which in
its very nature is essential to the preservation of the Nation? What
emergencies may arise in the future we can not tell, nor in what State or
section nor at what time.” 47 CONG. REC. 230 (1911) (remarks of Mr. Nye).
Congressman Lafferty stated, “[I]n the very nature of things it shocks the
conscience or the intelligence of a lawyer . . . that Congress should surrender
the power of providing for its own perpetuity.” 47 CONG. REC. 227 (1911)
(remarks of Mr. Lafferty). Congressman Saunders stated, “It has been
suggested that this language [in the original Constitution giving Congress the
power ‘to alter’ elections laws enacted by state legislatures] was inserted to
enable the Congress of the United States . . . to preserve itself in time of
emergency.” 47 CONG. REC. 233 (1911) (remarks of Mr. Saunders).
Congressman Miller stated the following:
It seems to me . . . that one great branch of Government [the Senate]
is hereby surrendering its power to perpetuate and maintain
itself . . . . By refusing to elect at all, [state legislatures could create a
situation in which] the legislative arm of the Federal Government
would be paralyzed. Many men now live who witnessed almost onehalf of the States withdraw from the Union and refuse to send
Members to Congress. That which happened once may happen
again . . . .
47 CONG. REC. 219 (1911) (remarks of Mr. Miller). These comments
regarding the possibility that states may secede in the future and fail to conduct
elections of senators and congressmen implies that Congress has the authority
to enact laws providing for the temporary filling of vacant House seats when it
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In other words, the history of the adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment does not indicate that Congress, in allowing for
states to provide for temporary appointment of senators, intended
to deny a similar mechanism to Congress—under its authority
granted in other provisions of the Constitution—to fill
temporarily vacant House seats. Indeed, Article I, Section 4,
Clause 1 of the Constitution may provide such a mechanism.9
That provision states that “The Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations . . . .”10 Under this provision, Congress might, by
statute, provide for the temporary filling of vacant House seats
by either authorizing states to provide for temporary
appointments of House members, by authorizing elections of
House members by a restricted electorate, or by providing itself
with such authority in the legislation. Congress could pass such
legislation following the need to fill vacancies, even if there were
only three surviving House members.11 Each of those situations
proves impossible or difficult to conduct prompt general elections in a
particular state.
In any case, the House ultimately voted to accept the original Senatepassed version of the Seventeenth Amendment and to reject a provision taking
away Congress’ authority “to alter” state election laws in cases of
“emergency.” See 47 CONG. REC. 233 (1911) (remarks of Mr. Saunders).
While the House, on April 13, 1911, passed a version of the Seventeenth
Amendment that included an additional clause denying Congress its existing
constitutional authority to alter state laws governing the election of senators,
on April 23, 1911, the Senate voted to insist on its version of the Seventeenth
Amendment, which did not contain such a provision, and on May 13, 1911,
the House passed the Senate’s version of the Seventeenth Amendment, which
is now part of our Constitution. See U.S. Const. Amend. XVII.
9
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
10
Id. (emphasis added).
11
Article 1, Section 5 provides that “a Majority of each [House] shall
constitute a Quorum to do Business,” and that provision has been interpreted
by Congress to mean a majority of members who have been duly sworn,
chosen, and living. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5; House Manual, § 53 (“So the
decision of the House now is that after the House is once organized the
quorum consists of a majority of those members chosen, sworn, and living
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would still constitute a quorum under House rules, after which
the Senate could then pass the legislation. Further, if Congress
acted after any such tragedy, it would be able to assess the actual
emergency at hand instead of attempting to predict the contours
of an imagined future emergency.12
whose membership has not been terminated by resignation, or by the action of
the House.”). Congress is authorized to interpret the rules governing its own
proceedings by Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution, which provides that
“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings . . . .” This would
be so even if massive vacancies occurred before a new House in a new
Congress had adopted its rules for the session. One of the first items of
business the House addresses in each new Congress is the adoption of rules
that will govern its proceedings during that Congress. Until the new rules are
adopted, the House operates under “general parliamentary procedure,” which
allows a simple majority vote to decide an issue or close debate. See 107
CONG. REC. 239 (1961). Under the general parliamentary law that governs
before the adoption of the standing rules, a quorum is established by the
presence of a majority of those listed on the roll of members-elect prepared by
the clerk of the preceding Congress pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 26 (1997). The
clerk does not include on that roll a member-elect who is deceased. After a
quorum of members-elect is established, a speaker is elected. Once sworn, the
speaker administers the oath to members-elect. At that point a quorum is a
majority of those so sworn. Officers are then elected, and rules are adopted.
At that point a quorum is a majority of those living and sworn or such other
number as the rules might specify for a particular purpose. Therefore, a vote
of as few as two out of three living and sworn members could enact the rules
governing the House in a new Congress.
12
In the event that not even three House members were alive or not
incapacitated, martial law could be imposed with its consequent administration
either ratified or rejected by a functional Congress that is subsequently
composed. According to one historian:
That martial law was not always considered oppressive is shown by
the fact that citizens sometimes petitioned for it. Some
Philadelphians, for instance, requested the President to declare
martial law in their city at the time of [Confederate General Robert
E.] Lee’s invasion to enable them to put the city in a proper state of
defense. Nor should we suppose that the existence of martial law
necessarily involved a condition of extensive or continuous military
restraint. Beginning with September, 1863, the District of Columbia
was subjected to martial law, and this state of affairs continued
throughout the war, but it should not be supposed that residents of the
capital city were usually conscious of serious curtailment of their
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Such legislation could provide for the quick, temporary filling
of House member seats in emergencies by, for example,
providing that vacant House seats could be filled by an “election”
with a very limited franchise in which only the governor and the
highest-ranking member of each house of each state legislature
may vote.13 Because the electorate in such an election would
liberties. The condition of martial law was here used as a means of
military security. That martial law should be declared in areas of
actual military operations was, of course, not remarkable.
See JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 170
(Univ. of Ill. Press 1964) (rev. ed.).
In fulfilling constitutional responsibilities to put down insurrection,
rebellion, or invasion, the president may resort to invoking martial law. His
action, in this regard, is subject to judicial review. See, e.g., Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 142 (1866) (“MARTIAL LAW PROPER . . . is called
into action by Congress, or temporarily, when the action of Congress cannot
be invited, and in the case of justifying or excusing peril, by the President, in
times of insurrection or invasion, or of civil or foreign war, within districts or
localities where ordinary law no longer adequately secures public safety and
private rights.”); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 402-03 (1932). The
president may also exercise certain authority to create a condition similar to,
but not actually one of, martial law:
[In the event] the President considers that unlawful obstructions,
combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of
the United States make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the
United States in any State or Territory by the ordinary course of
judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the
militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers
necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion.
10 U.S.C. § 332 (1998).
13
The legislation outlined here could take the following form:
Section 1. If at any time one-quarter of the Members of the House of
Representatives are unable to carry out their duties because of death
or incapacity, the highest ranking executive officer and the highest
ranking members of each branch of the legislature of a State
represented by a Member who has died or become incapacitated may
elect an otherwise qualified individual to take the place of the
Member as soon as practicable but in no event later than seven days
after the member’s death or incapacity has been certified by the
President.
Section 2. An individual elected to take the place of a Member of the
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consist of only three people, it could be conducted quickly.
Indeed, Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No. 59, foresaw
the need for the national legislature—Congress—to have the
constitutional authority to preserve itself in times of crisis. When
discussing Article I, Section 4, Clause 1, Hamilton wrote that “I
am greatly mistaken . . . if there be any article in the whole plan
[of the Constitution] more completely defensible than this. Its
propriety rests upon the evidence of this plain proposition, that
every government ought to contain in itself the means of its own
preservation.”14 Failure to recognize such a principle in the
Federal Constitution, Hamilton wrote, would constitute
“imperfection in the system which may prove the seed of future
weakness, and perhaps anarchy.”15 Hamilton continued that
“[members of the Constitutional Convention] have submitted the
regulation of elections for the federal government, in the first
instance, to the local administrations; [but] they have reserved to
the national authority a right to interpose, whenever
extraordinary circumstances might render that interposition
necessary to its safety.”16
Congress cannot indefinitely suspend elections open to a
larger electorate, as Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution
requires that “[w]hen vacancies happen in the Representation
House of Representatives under Section 1 shall be treated as a
Member of the House of Representatives and may serve until a
Member is elected pursuant to a writ of election to fill the vacancy
resulting from the death or incapacity.
This or similar legislation could further specify that the person chosen to
fill a vacant House seat be a member of the same political party as its former
occupant. Providing for the filling of vacant House seats with reference to
political parties by statute also has the advantage of keeping out of the
Constitution a reference to political parties. The Constitution currently
contains no mention of political parties.
14
THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, at 362 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
15
Id.
16
Id. Article 1, Section 4, Clause 1 also gives state legislatures the
authority to pass legislation so providing that vacant House seats representing
their state be filled temporarily, which Congress may or may not supercede by
law. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
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from any State, the Executive authority thereof shall issue Writs
of Election to fill such Vacancies.”17 However, a requirement
that writs of election—which simply require that there be an
election of some sort—must issue following a vacancy does not in
itself deny Congress the authority to provide for the election, by
a very limited electorate of state political leaders, of members to
temporarily fill House vacancies in certain emergency situations.
II. THE CONSTITUTION’S VOTING RIGHTS PROVISIONS
Legislation providing for the election of members to
temporarily fill House vacancies would also not violate the
Constitution’s voting provisions. The Constitution prohibits
certain discriminatory barriers to the right to vote, such as those
based on race,18 sex,19 poll taxes,20 or age over 18 years,21 when
such a right is extended. It does not guarantee, however, the
right to vote per se.22 It follows that Congress could pass a law
limiting the franchise to certain state political leaders who could
fill vacant House seats temporarily as long as access to those
positions of political leadership were not impeded by
discriminatory barriers based on race, sex, or age over eighteen.
Also, a unanimous Supreme Court, in Rodriguez v. Popular

17

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
19
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
20
See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1.
21
See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
22
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 n. 78
(1973).
Since the right to vote, per se, is not a constitutionally protected
right[,] references to that right are simply shorthand references to the
protected right, implicit in our constitutional system, to participate in
state elections on an equal basis with other qualified voters whenever
the State has adopted an elective process for determining who will
represent any segment of the State’s population.
Id. See also Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874) (“[T]he
Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of suffrage upon
any one.”).
18
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Democratic Party,23 held that Puerto Rico statutes that vested in a
single political party the initial authority to appoint interim
replacements for vacancies in the Puerto Rico legislature until the
next regularly scheduled general election do not violate the
Federal Constitution, including its Equal Protection Clause.
Those challenging the statutes claimed that “qualified voters have
a federal constitutional right to elect their representatives to the
Puerto Rico Legislature, and that vacancies in legislative offices
therefore must be filled by a special election open to all qualified
electors” and that because such vacancies were not so filled,
other “qualified voters” were denied “equal protection.”24 The
Supreme Court rejected both these arguments:
[T]he Puerto Rico statute at issue here does not restrict
access to the electoral process or afford unequal treatment
to different classes of voters or political parties. All
qualified voters have an equal opportunity to select a
district representative in the general election; and the
interim appointment provision applies uniformly to all
legislative vacancies, whenever they arise . . . .
Obviously, a statute designed to deal with the occasional
problem of legislative vacancies will affect only those
districts in which vacancies actually arise. However, such
a statute is not for this reason rendered invalid under
equal protection principles. A vacancy in the legislature is
an unexpected, unpredictable event, and a statute
providing that all such vacancies be filled by appointment
does not have a special impact on any discrete group of
voters or candidates.25
Neither does Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution
require that elections, other than regularly held general elections,
be open to an electorate sharing the same qualifications as those
requisite for electors of “the most numerous Branch of the State
23

457 U.S. 1, 8 (1982) (stating that “it is clear that the voting rights of
Puerto Rico citizens are constitutionally protected to the same extent as those
of all other citizens of the United States”).
24
Id. at 7.
25
Id. at 10 n.10.
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Legislature.”26 That provision of the Constitution only requires
that the “Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications
requisite for electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature” during elections for the House of Representatives
conducted “every second year,” namely in general elections
regularly held, not special elections to fill vacancies until the next
general election.27

26

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 provides in full that “The House of
Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by
the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. While there is some ambiguity
regarding whether this qualifications clause applies only to general elections or
to both general and special elections, if the latter is the case, state legislatures
should be able to enact provisions for temporarily filling vacant House seats
when, for example, the member’s death or incapacity has been certified by the
governor. Such a law would simply declare that during a specified emergency
situation, the electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature
would consist of only the governor and the highest-ranking member of each
house of the state legislature.
It may be argued that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
for a reduction in a state’s representatives in proportion to a state’s
disenfranchisement of its male citizens over the age of twenty-one. Section 2
of the Fourteenth Amendment provides as follows:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of
persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right
to vote at any election for the choice of Electors for . . .
Representatives in Congress . . . is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens
of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation
in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall
be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of
age in such State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
This provision, however, has never been enforced, and it is unclear
whether it would apply to only temporary reductions in the franchise triggered
by emergency circumstances.
27
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III. CONGRESS’S AUTHORITY TO “ALTER” STATE REGULATIONS
GOVERNING FEDERAL ELECTIONS
In arguing for the repeal of the clause in Article 1, Section 4
of our Constitution that gives Congress the authority “to alter”
election laws enacted by state legislatures, Congressman
Saunders argued in 1911 that “no one has ever been able to
ascertain the extent of the power conferred by the present
language [of the Constitution] upon the Congress of the United
States.”28 That statement remains true today, and Congress’
authority “to alter” election laws by providing for the temporary
appointment of congressmen to fill vacant House seats is unclear.
However, if through some terrible tragedy the vast majority of
House members’ seats were left vacant, there is further authority
for the proposition that Congress could by statute provide for
temporary appointments—rather than elections by a restricted
electorate—to fill vacant House seats. While some may argue that
Congress’ power to “make or alter” regulations regarding the
“election” of House members does not include the power to
dispense with an election altogether, such an argument rests on
the definition of the word “alter,” one modern definition of
which today is “to make different without changing into
something else.”29 However, the framers of the Constitution were
not likely to have recognized the definition of “alter” to include
something as subtle as “to make different without changing into
something else.” The definition of “to alter” in A Dictionary of
the English Language by Samuel Johnson, published in 1797 and
on its eleventh edition at that time, is “[t]o change; to make
otherwise than it is.”30

28

47 CONG. REC. 233 (1911) (remarks of Mr. Saunders).
WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1991)
(emphasis added).
30
A catalog entry from Thomas Jefferson’s library shows that Johnson’s
English Dictionary was part of Jefferson’s personal collection. See THOMAS
JEFFERSON’S LIBRARY: A CATALOG WITH THE ENTRIES IN HIS OWN ORDER
(James Gilreath & Douglas L. Wilson eds., 1989) (emphasis added).
29
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CONCLUSION
While it has become a sort of popular wisdom that the quick,
temporary filling of House member seats in emergencies can be
provided for only through a constitutional amendment, there is
independent authority in the Constitution authorizing Congress,
by statute, to do just that, if necessary, following a dire
emergency. Neither the intent behind the Seventeenth
Amendment, nor the Constitution’s voting rights provisions,
prohibit Congress’ exercise of its authority under Article I,
Section 4, Clause 1 to provide for the temporary filling of vacant
House seats either through elections by a limited electorate or
possibly by appointment.

